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FINITE FREEDOM, FRACTURED AND FRAGILE 
KANT'S ANTHROPOLOGY AS RESOURCE 
FOR A POSTMODERN THEOLOGY OF GRACE 
I. FRACTURED SITUATEDNESS 
In laying out the conceptual topography of "the conflicts of moder-
nity" at the conclusion of Sources of the Self: The Making of the Mod-
ern Identity, Charles Taylor notes "the crucial importance of the strands 
of philosophy .,. which have been trying .. , to develop anthropologies 
of situated freedom" 1. He considers development of such anthropologies 
important for countering the ways in which contending strands of mod-
em moral discourse and practice have constricted the range of goods that 
humans may legitimately affIrm as morally compelling: These contend-
ing strands "find their way through the dilemmas of modernity by inval-
idating some of the goods in contest"2. In tandem with the case he 
advances for developing "languages of personal resonance" to articulate 
the legitimacy of the moral weight of these contested human goods, Tay-
lor underwrites the need for "anthropologies of situated freedom" in 
terms of a set of philosophical considerations about human self-identity 
within which important theological subtexts about the relation of the 
human to the divine may be discerned3• In both cases, Taylor's engage-
1. Charles TAYLOR, Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity, Cam-
bridge, Cambridge University Press, 1989, pp. 514-515. Taylor does not offer a themati-
cally focused treatment of "situated freedom" in Sources of the Self; his account relies 
upon his previous discussion of this concept in Hegel, Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press, 1975, pp. 559-571; reproduced in Hegel and Modern Society, Cambridge, Cam-
bridge University Press, 1979, pp. 154-169. 
2. TAYLOR, Sources (n. 1), p. 503. A fundamental "zone of conflict" in which Taylor 
sees each party contesting the validity of crucial ioods affirmed by the other is that 
between "disengaged instrumentalism and the Romantic or modernist protest against it" 
(Sources, p. 498). Some of the "contested goods" at issue playa constitutive role within 
the contending strands, e.g., the instrumentalized ways of life on the side of the propo-
nents of disengaged reason, self-exploration on the side of proponents of (subjective) 
expressivism. Other "contested goods" are those overlooked by both parties in that zone 
of conflict, "for instance, why it matters and what it means to have a more deeply reso-
nant human environment and, even more, to have affiliations with some depth in time and 
commitment" (Sources, p. 513). 
3. See Philip ROSSI, Divine Transcendence and the Languages of Personal Reso-
nance, in J. lIAERs - P. DE May (eds.), Theology and Conversation: Towards a Relational 
Theology (BElL, 172), Leuven, Peeters, 2003, pp. 783-794,. for an exploration of the the-
ological dimensions operative in his notion of "languages of personal resonance". 
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ment with fundamental issues of human good - What constitutes gen-
uine human good? What makes such good possible? What are the con-
ditions for properly discerning it and for definitively attaining it? - occa-
sionally takes note that such issues stand within a horizon of questions 
of how the human stands in relation to the divine4• Perhaps in view of an 
audience perceived as willing to give hearing to philosophical modes of 
discourse in his work, but wary of transpositions of such discourse into 
theological modes, Taylor does not pursue these questions about human 
good in an explicitly theological manner. Careful attention to certain 
aspects of Taylor's treatment of these issues suggests, however, that his 
brief notice of their theological dimensions is more than a polite bow in 
the direction of the historical role that Christian thought once played in 
framing them. Taylor's discussions also point to specific theological/oei 
that continue to be pertinent to these issues. The one they point to most 
insistently - and thus the one this essay explores - is that of "grace", 
particularly as Christian traditions have forged it as an appropriate con-
ceptuallocus for theological exploration of fundamental questions about 
human good. 
My goal in this essay is thus to lend theological support to Taylor's 
philosophical case that we need "anthropologies of situated freedom" by 
indicating how such anthropologies may serve as "prolegomena" for 
theological understandings of grace appropriate to the fragmented cul-
tures of meaning for which the term "post-modernity" often stands as 
signpost. I will argue that framing an anthropology that is explicitly sit-
uated in reference to what Taylor terms "fractured horizons" of meaning 
may prove useful in constructing a theology of grace properly attentive 
to the fragmentation that deeply marks so many of the modes of human 
life and meaning in which the exercise of human freedom is now 
increasingly immersed. To provide an orientation to that horizon of frag-
mented meaning and the circumstances it encompasses, I will look prin-
cipally to the work of Taylor and others who, while writing from a 
stance often unflinchingly critical of key features of modernity, nonethe-
less can be considered neither '''boosters' nor 'knockers' who either 
condemn or affIrm modernity en bloc"5. I consider their work to offer 
particularly useful coordinates for situating us upon a terrain they all rec-
ognize as seriously fractured, and for which our human resources for 
successful negotiation are slender and fragile - but upon which neither 
4. See TAYLOR, Sources (n. 1), pp. 410-413, for an instance in which he makes 
explicit a connection these questions have to notions of grace. 
5. Charles TAYLOR, A Catholic Modernity?, in James L. HEFT (ed.), Charles Taylor'S 
Marianist Award Lecture, New York, Oxford University Press, 1999, p. 36. 
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the fracturing of the terrain nor the fragility of our resources thereby 
require us to abandon all hope for safe traverse. Within this context, I 
will then propose some initial elements upon which to start construction 
of an anthropology of appropriately situated freedom. I will suggest that 
it may draw at least some elements from what may seem a surprising 
source, inasmuch as that source provided, according to many standard 
accounts of the emergence of modernity, a seminal delineation of the 
very "unsituated" human freedom that played a pivotal role in the intel-
lectual dynamics that brought about the fractured landscape of moder-
nity. This source is an anthropology of free, finite human moral agency, 
as it is both embedded in and articulated through the critical writings of 
Immanuel Kant 
Two major considerations lie behind my proposal to re-read Kant 
against the grain of accounts - that start at least as far back as Hegel -
in which his formal rendering of freedom is understood as abstracting it 
from every concrete human situs - and doing so precisely in order for 
freedom to have the universality necessary for its moral purchase on 
human action. In contrast to this thin, unpromising view of the anthro-
pological locus of Kantian freedom, the first consideration in favor of a 
new reading of Kant's anthropology arises in consequence of signifi-
cantly different interpretive directions that Kant scholarship has been 
exploring for at least two decades. These studies have been building a 
case for understanding his philosophical rendering of human moral life 
to include - and perhaps even to rest upon - a far more robust under-
standing of our human cosmic and social situatedness than has previ-
ously been recognized6. In contrast, for instance, to an almost exclusive 
stress on formal and deontological elements in Kant's account of the 
maxims governing an individual agent's moral choice, more recent stud-
ies take note of Kant's placement of these accounts in texts that attend to 
the concrete lineaments of ordinary human moral life. They give weight 
to the fact that crucial points of his arguments draw support, not from an 
abstract reading of rationality, but from direct appeal to such things as 
6. For example, Sharon ANDERSON GoLD, Unnecessary Evil, Albany, NY, State Univer-
sity of New York Press, 2001; Patrick FRIERSON, Freedom and Anthropology in Kant's 
Moral Philosophy, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2003; Jeanine GRENBERG, 
Kantian Humility, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2005; Susan NEIMAN, Evil in 
Modern Thought: An Alternative History of Philosophy, Princeton, NJ, Princeton University 
Press, 2002; The Unity of Reason: Rereading Kant, New York, Oxford University Press, 
1994; Robert LoUDEN, Kant's Impure Ethics: From Rational Beings to Human Beings, New 
York, Oxford University Press, 2000; G. Felicitas MUNZEL, Kant's Conception of Moral 
Character, Chicago, IL, University of Chicago Press, 1999; Philip J. ROSSI, The Social 
Authority of Reason, Albany, NY, State University of New York Press, 2005; Holly L. WILSON, 
Kant's Pragmatic Anthropology, Albany, NY, State University of New York Press, 2006. 
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"the common idea of duty and moral laws", "natural sound understand-
ing", "the common human reason", and "the moral cognition of com-
mon human reason "7. These discussions of moral agency are marked by 
a deep respect for the humanity in every individual, whatever his or her 
status or condition in society, that originated in Kant's reading of 
Rousseau8• In the context of Kant's critical philosophy, they provide one 
marker of that project's fundamental concern, not with an abstract form 
of reason, but with reason in the concrete form it takes in a humanity 
embodied in conditions of spatio-temporal finitude. On these more 
recent accounts, the critical project is thoroughly anthropological, con-
cerned with the unique position human beings occupy in the cosmos as 
the juncture of nature and freedom and with the vocation of humanity to 
bring about, in a manner appropriate to the exercise of finite reason, the 
conditions under which freedom and nature may work together for the 
attainment of "the highest good". 
The attention paid by this scholarship to the dimensions of human sit-
uatedness to which Kant attends in constructing his critical philosophy 
may then be further sharpened by placing it under the lens that contem-
porary intellectual discourse provides by its emphasis on notions such as 
"context", "particularity", "otherness", and "difference" in its readings 
of humanity's conditions and prospects. Under the interrogation of post-
modem questions, the paradigmatically modem texts of Kant's critical 
philosophy may yield, at least in some instances, surprisingly post-mod-
em responses9• To the extent that these re-readings of Kant have 
emerged in terms of elements often resonant with key markers of a 
"post-modem" intellectual sensibility, this first consideration thus 
stands coordinate with a second one, which also underlies the effort of 
this essay to bring Kant's philosophical anthropology to bear upon the 
theological discourse of grace. This second consideration arises from 
what I will propose as an interpretive trajectory on which the work of 
Charles Taylor, Susan Neiman, and George Steiner, variously converge 
as each describes our current human situatedness in the aftermath of 
7. Ground Work of the Metaphysics of Morals, trans. Mary J. GREGOR, in Paul GUYER-
Allen W. WOOD (eds.), Practical Philosophy: The Cambridge Edition of the Works of 
Immanuel Kant, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1996, pp. 44.52.57.58; Grund-
legung zur Metaphysik der Sitten, in Kants Gesammelte Schriften, Berlin, Konigliche 
PreuBichen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1902-,4, pp. 389.397.402.403. 
8. Manfred KUEHN, Kant: A Biography, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 
2001, pp. 131-132. 
9. A prime example of this may be found in NEIMAN, Evil (n. 6), in which Kant's 
understanding of the function of hope in the conditions of human finitude is crucial for 
resisting evil in a post-Auschwitz world. 
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modernitylO. This convergence emerges as they plot the course of the 
deep fissures that now lie athwart the terrain of human meaning, even as 
they also note how various efforts to traverse this terrain have disclosed 
the fragility of the resources we have as human to see us through safely. 
These tropes of "fracture" and "fragility" will thus provide a yoke by 
which I propose to link this interpretive trajectory upon our post-modem 
human situatedness to a re-reading of a Kantian anthropology of finite 
freedom. This link consists in the different yet complementary ways 
each trope exhibits how our current situatedness, precisely in con-
fronting us with the radically fractured fragility of our freedom, invites 
us - and perhaps even requires us - to re-think how our humanness 
stands in relation to the outpouring of divine freedom that Christian the-
ological traditions have sought to articulate in terms of concepts of 
"grace"ll. 
II. FRACTURED HORIZONS, FRAOMENfED TERRAIN 
Some of the recent re-readings of Kant - including those operative in 
the work of Taylor and Neiman - suggest that we may more readily take 
an initial sighting upon the key markers of a Kantian anthropology of the 
fragility of situated freedom from the perspective of the fractured terrain 
of the modernity subsequent to Kant, rather than from the perspective of 
what was once perceived as the unbroken intellectual landscape of his 
"Age of Enlightenment". Our own fractured cultural circumstances have 
brought to our attention how a variety of social, intellectual, economic 
and political dynamics functioned as tectonic forces shaping the land-
scape of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries into a far more varie-
gated and unstable terrain than what we had formerly glimpsed as an 
unbroken vista of "The" Enlightenment. I thus propose to open the case 
for re-reading Kant's anthropology as a resource for a theology of grace 
with an account of the interpretive trajectory that maps our contempo-
rary human situatedness onto terrains of "fractured meaning". Taylor, 
Neiman, and Steiner will serve as principal guides upon these terrains 
10. Such convergence is not limited to the work of these three. I believe that a case 
can be made that, among others, the work of philosophers such as Iris Murdoch, Louis 
Dupre, and D.Z. Phillips, theologians such as Michael Buckley and David Tracy, and 
intellectual historians such as Martin Jay, contain significant elements also heading 
toward such a convergence. 
11. It is important to understand that this claim is that notions of "grace" serve as one 
reflective theological articulation of divine freedom. They are not the sole theological 
locus for such articulation, nor is freedom the only aspect of the divine that such notions 
seek to articulate. 
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because their sure footedness here seems oriented by markers of the 
human that, particularly in the crucial case of the fragility of human free-
dom, lie close to those that had been staked earlier out by Kant. In addi-
tion, they each seem acutely aware - as was Kant - that on these terrains 
of fractured meaning, with a fragile freedom as one of our slender 
resources for navigation, God and humanity have both been put in ques-
tion in radical, seemingly unprecedented ways. 
The remark from Taylor with which I started this essay occurs in the 
concluding chapter of Sources of the Self, titled "The Conflicts of 
Modernity". This chapter, concerned with exploring the three "zones" 
of conflict that Taylor sees emergent on the moral terrain of modernityl2, 
is placed against a background image of "fractured horizons". That 
image served as title for an earlier chapter in which Taylor's probing of 
the "whole modem development we gesture at with the word 'secular-
ization"'13 disputes accounts that understand the decline of religious 
belief and practice in much recent Western culture to be an inevitable 
consequence of modernizing institutional changes and/or the rise of sci-
ence. That chapter sets the stage for a three chapter exposition of Tay-
lor's alternative reading of the conditions that have made unbelief cul-
turally plausible. He articulates this alternative in terms of "two big 
constellations of ideas which either immediately or over time have 
helped generate forms of unbelief"14. One constellation clusters around 
the powers of disengaged human reason; the other around the powers of 
human creative imagination. On Taylor's account, the unbelief of the 
secular age has emerged insofar as, first, each "constellation" has pro-
vided a central focus for construing the powers of the human self emer-
gent in the course of modernity and, second, as each focus has also 
gained credibility as a moral source apart from the theistic ground out of 
which it historically arose. Both foci are anthropological in that they are 
each indexed to a specific human power as it operates in relation to its 
particular reflexive construal of nature. One centers upon the powers of 
disengaged human reason to exercise control within the domain of an 
instrumentalized nature; the other upon "the powers of creative imagi-
nation ... [that] links these [powers] to a sense of nature as an inner 
moral source" 15. Taylor sees emergent in the tensive interplay of the two 
"constellations of ideas" an outcome that has "diversified our moral 
12. These "zones" involve conflicts over, respectively "(I) the issue about sources, 
(2) the issue about instrumentalism, and (3) the issue about morality" (TAYLOR, Sources 
[no I], p. 499). 
13. TAYLOR, Sources (n. 1), p. 309. 
14. Ibid., p. 319. 
15. Ibid., p. 319. 
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sources and added two frontiers of exploration to the original theistic 
one: nature and our own powers"l6, 
Taylor sees a complicated interplay taking place during the nineteenth 
century between the "two big and many-sided cultural transformations, 
the Enlightenment and Romanticism with its accompanying expressive 
conception of man, [that] have made us what we are"l7. Within this 
interplay, Taylor sees an issue emerging "which doesn't have an exact 
precedent in earlier times", one that he terms "the issue of self -affirma-
tion"l8. As Taylor probes the newly problematic status of "self-affirma-
tion", two related issues of key import for framing a post-modern theol-
ogy of grace begin to take shape in the unfolding of his theological 
subtext: 1) the possibilities for recognizing and affirming good, both of 
ourselves and of nature, as well as 2) our capacities for effecting the 
good we affirm. 
Taylor's discussion shows marks of the presence of both issues. With 
regard to the first, he explicitly places the issue of self-affIrmation 
against the horizon of a Christian theology of creation for which "it is 
never possible to escape altogether the notion that the creation is ulti-
mately good"l9. He further recognizes that a Christian theological affIr-
mation of the goodness of creation bears upon the notion of "grace" as 
a locus for its articulation both as the gratuity of God that brings created 
good to be and as divine empowerment of human capacities to love what 
is good. In addition to this explicit indexing to the doctrine of Creation, 
Taylor provides a more allusive, but still clearly recognizable linkage 
of grace to the doctrine of the Incarnation through his notion of an 
"epiphany", i.e., "a manifestation which brings us into the presence of 
something which is otherwise inaccessible ... which also defines or com-
pletes something, even as it reveals"20. This notion is crucial for moving 
the later chapters in Sources toward a construal of grace as empower-
ment to effect the good that seeing and loving good affirms. It serves 
the function - marked out by references to the Johannine texts of the 
New Testament - of expressing an interweaving of the activity of God 
in Creation with the activity of God in Incarnation. For Taylor, the 
"epiphanic", as it functions within what he sees as a distinctively mod-
ern sense of expressive "inner depth", provides us with a crucial mode 
16. Ibid., p. 390. 
17. Ibid., p. 393. 
18. Ibid., p. 447. 
19. Ibid., p. 448. 
20. Ibid., p. 419. See Philip J. ROSSI, Seeing Good in a World of Suffering: Incarna-
tion as God's Transforming Vision (forthcoming). 
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of active participation in the "seeing good" of God that is operative in 
Creation and in the Incarnation: 
Put in yet other tenns, the world's being good may now be seen as not 
entirely independent of our seeing it and showing it as good, at least as far 
as the world of humans is concemed21 • 
Taylor had noted earlier that grace (or a secularized counterpart) plays 
an important role in accounts of what makes possible commitment to 
"the very stringent demands of universal justice and benevolence"22 that 
have become the constitutive goods informing the dominant moral con-
cerns of modernity. That earlier discussion of the power of moral 
sources to move us did not explicitly situate its account of that power in 
the context of questions about the goodness of creation or about our 
capacities to recognize, affIrm, and effect that goodness. This later dis-
cussion, however, suggests that a construal of such empowerment that is 
appropriate to the aftermath of modernity will need to encompass, as 
part of its account of the graced human capacity to affIrm and love good, 
a participation in those dimensions of God's creative and incarnately 
salvifIc power in which seeing and loving good brings good to be. What 
this part of such an account might look like, and why its inclusion may 
be useful in a articulating a theology of grace appropriate to the frac-
tured context of post-modem culture, will be the focus of the next, con-
cluding section of this essay. 
III. GOD'S HOSPITALITY UPON FRACTURED HUMAN GROUND: 
AN ANTHROPOLOGY OF GRACE FOR OUR TIME 
If I have correctly read the theological subtext operative in Taylor's 
depiction of the cultures of late modernity, it offers an invitation to 
develop specifIcally theological resources to address a multi7dimen-
sional crisis endemic to these cultures regarding the nature, scope, and 
quality of the articulations and affIrmations of good they allow us to 
make - be they affIITOations of the good of the cosmos or of the human 
selves dwelling in the cosmos. These resources could function as signif-
icant coordinates for the task of articulating the "anthropologies of situ-
ated freedom" that Taylor sees providing the conceptual frameworks 
through which we might effectively begin to resolve this crisis. More 
specifIcally, I fmd Taylor's subtext presenting a challenge to develop, as 
21. TAYLOR, Sources (n. 1), p. 448. 
22. Ibid., p. 410. 
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a step toward a theological anthropology of situated freedom, a construal 
of grace appropriate to the fragmented circumstances of post-modernity. 
Such a construal would provide an account of the graced form of human 
capacities to affirm and love good that articulates how they participate in 
God's creative and incarnate salvific powers in which seeing and loving 
good brings good to be in a thoroughly fragmented world. 
This fmal section does not pretend to offer a full response to this chal-
lenge; it will simply propose two considerations that may be of use in 
constructing such an account. The first indicates how reading Kant's 
anthropology as an anthropology of the fragility of human freedom 
offers a framework for a construal of the human locus for the working of 
grace appropriate to post-modern circumstances of fractured meaning. 
That locus is the very condition of human fragility in a fractured world. 
The second then proposes a particular locus within that fragility that 
invites our human freedom to the performance and practice of graced 
enactments of the seeing and loving of good that brings good to be in a 
form that I believe holds major import for our human engagement with 
one another on the fragmented terrain of post-modernity. Our current 
human circumstances may offer no more poignant and tragic display of 
the impact of the dynamics of fragmentation upon the capacities of our 
freedom than the large and small scale uprootings of peoples in conse-
quence of local, regional, and international conflicts, attempted ethnic 
cleansing and genocide, in response to which the toleration, let alone the 
welcoming of those who leave their native lands - be it unwillingly in 
fear for their lives or willingly in hope of better circumstances - is 
becoming increasingly constricted out of hesitation and fear in the pres-
ence of cultural and religious difference. In consequence, a crucial locus 
in which human freedom may be called upon to enact a seeing good that 
brings good to be may very well be encompassed in the welcoming com-
portment of human hospitality. Such hospitality, as enacted risk both of 
greeting another's vulnerability out of one's own vulnerability and of the 
acceptance of that risk by the one welcomed, exhibits to a fractured 
world a concrete fragment of the divine hospitality displayed to us in 
Creation and Incarnation: The hospitality in which God makes the frac-
tured world a place for divine welcoming of the human in all its contin-
gency and brokenness. 
1. Kant's Anthropology of the Fragility of Human Freedom 
Kant's anthropology of the fragility of human freedom marks a major 
fault line on the fractured terrain of modernity upon which Taylor's 
... 
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explorations in Sources of the Self converge with those undertaken by 
Susan Neiman in Evil in Modern Thought: An Alternative History of 
Philosophy23. This fault-line is one that, as it runs through the self, also 
marks a fissuring of the self from both nature and God. Neiman provides 
coordinates to locate this fault-line as the fmitude of human freedom 
lying athwart the workings of created nature in their radical contingency 
with respect to human intents and purposes: "Are our capacities to find 
and create meaning in a world adequate to a world that seems deter-
mined to thwart them?"24. She suggests that this fissure marks the point 
upon which Kant's entire critical enterprise - and with it, his philosoph-
ical anthropology - pivots: 
Kant offers a metaphysic of permanent rupture. The gap between nature 
and freedom, is and ought, conditions all human existence ... Integrity 
requires affmning the dissonance and conflict at the heart of experience. It 
means recognizing that we are never, metaphysically, at home in the 
world25 • 
Neiman's attentiveness to the depth to which Kant charted the major 
contours of this fissure is particularly instructive for reminding us how 
his charting continues to provide definitive markers of the human condi-
tion addressed by grace. She and Taylor each understand how Kant's 
recognition of the inestimable dignity of the power of human freedom to 
effect good is equally a recognition that such power resides in agents 
who are profoundly fragile: The human power for bringing good to be 
thoroughly pertains to, and is rooted in, the fragmentary, fragile exercise 
of a fmite practical reason. With respect to the exercise of that power in 
the contemporary context of shattered meanings Neiman adds, "where 
so many structures of modem thought have been shattered, whatever 
sense we find must be incomplete. Attention to the pieces is now all the 
more important" 26. For his part, Taylor clearly recognizes that Kant's 
account of autonomy - the self-responsibility of finite human rational 
agency - marks a divide from "nature", that, at least with respect to 
what has power to move us morally, parallels the Augustinian divide 
between "the two loves, the two directions of human motivation"27. 
Even the commitment to universal justice that, as a "secularized variant 
23. NEIMAN, Evil (n. 6). 
24. Ibid., p. 318; see also p. 322: "the drive to seek reason in the world - even, 
or especially, at the points where it seems most absent - is as deep a drive as any we 
have". 
25. Ibid., p. 80. 
26. Ibid., p. 326. 
27. TAYLOR, Sources (n. 1), p. 366; cf. ibid., p. 83. 
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of agape", eventually comes to empower the higher of these two loves 
to "stupendous humanitarian efforts" as modernity has unfolded, rests 
upon a Kantian basis, noumenal rational agency, that Taylor tellingly 
characterizes as "fragile"28. 
To the tropes of fragmentation and fragility, Neiman's marking of the 
fault line upon which Kant's account of human freedom functions adds 
the poignant one of "homeless" to signal the human condition in a 
world in which meaning has been left in fragments. Taylor's marking of 
this fault line - which, at least in Kant's own reading, is at once a marker 
of a rupture and a juncture deeply bound to our human fmitude29 -
employs a trope that may seem gentler than Neiman's "homeless" but 
still expresses the same sense that humanity has found itself cast adrift 
in the aftermath of modernity: He writes of a "loss of rooted certainty" 
that occurs when moral sources not bound to belief in God gain credi-
bility3o. Yet for both Neiman and Taylor, as it was for Kant, this marker 
of our human finitude - characterized by Neiman as "the gap between 
our purposes and a nature that is indifferent to them leaves the world 
with an almost unacceptable structure"31 - however much it stands as a 
reminder of being homeless and uncertain on the fractured terrain of 
modernity, still does not leave us bereft of all hope for finding a wel-
come that even will embrace our fragility. 
2. Guests to One Another: Grace as Mutual Welcome on Fractured 
Ground 
Despite the apparent bleakness signaled by the trope of "homeless", 
Neiman does not recommend despair as the fitting human response to 
the fragmented condition of late modernity. She sees the persistent 
inquisitiveness of the child as sign of an unquenchable hope for making 
sense of the world that, in formal philosophical terms, is expressed in the 
principle of sufficient reason: 
The urge to greet every answer with another question is one we fmd in 
children not because it's childish but because it's natural... In the child's 
refusal to accept a world that makes no sense lies all the hope that ever 
makes us start anew32• 
28. Ibid., p. 367. 
29. For an account of Kant's portrayal of the function of fmite human reason as junc-
ture between nature and freedom, see Philip J. ROSSI, The Social Authority of Reason 
(n.6). 
30. TAYLOR, Sources (n. 1), p. 312. 
31. NEIMAN, Evil (n. 6), p. 75. 
32. Ibid., p. 320. 
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Neiman's image of the child is a powerful one for capturing the per-
sonal and individual dimension of the dynamics of hope that she affirms 
as appropriate to a fragmented world. Yet the resources for hope in the 
face of such fragmentation are not merely personal and individual. So it 
may be that a different image - indeed, one that appropriately stands as 
converse to the trope of "homeless" - may better serve to locate a place 
within an anthropology of the fragility of freedom from which to articu-
late a graced empowerment for seeing and loving good that brings good 
to be. Such an image plays a central role in George Steiner's account of 
the fragmentation of meaning. In face of a recognition similar to that of 
Neiman's that we all stand "homeless" on a terrain of fractured mean-
ing, Steiner opens possibilities for seeing and enacting good appropriate 
to our circumstances on that terrain by proposing that we need to com-
port ourselves as "guests to one another"33 in our sojourn on this frac-
tured ground. 
Like Neiman and Taylor, Steiner sees the dynamics of modernity and 
its aftermath as that of break: and rupture: 
It is this break of the covenant between word and world which constitutes 
one of the very few genuine revolutions of spirit in Western history, and 
which defmes modernity itself34. 
In the face of so deep a rupture, he proposes that our engagement with 
one another on this fractured terrain requires more than ever before (now 
that we are in the "after-word"35) that receptivity of mutually encoun-
tered freedom he variously terms "courtesia", "tact of heart", a recep-
tivity he sees exhibited in "the intuition that the true reception of a 
guest, of a known stranger in our place of being touches on transcendent 
obligations and opportunities"36. Even more pointedly, he has reaf-
firmed the importance of this fundamental receptivity in the face of the 
whole array of dynamics through which human beings in late modernity 
have made themselves ever more deeply complicit in systemic refusals 
of otherness: 
33. Theo HOBSON, On Being a Perfect Guest: The Tablet Interview, in The Tablet 259 
(13 August 2(05), p. 15. 
34. George STEINER, Real Presences, Chicago, IL, University of Chicago Press, 1989, 
p. 93, author's emphasis. 
35. George STEINER, Grammars of Creation, New Haven, cr - London, Yale University 
Press, 2001, p. 283; earlier Steiner remarks "I believe this dissociation, this tidal wave 
against the word to be more severe and consequential than any other in modernity. Indeed, 
it may defme the essence of modernity as that which 'comes after'" (p. 278). 
36. STEINER, Real Presences (n. 34), p. 155. 
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I believe we must teach other human beings to be guests of each other ... 
We must teach people we are guests of life on this crowded, polluted 
planet37• 
Steiner's identification of hospitality as a practice central to any ade-
quately human response to the pervasive circumstances of fractured 
meaning comports particularly well with the configuration that an 
anthropology of the fragility of freedom would take; it also bears at least 
faint traces of the considerations that led Kant to propose a "cosmopoli-
tan right to hospitality" as an appropriate articulation of the manner in 
which human freedom is to respect the otherness of the stranger who 
comes to visit in our midst38• It is a practice in which we learn how our 
human status in the world is marked by mutual vulnerability to one 
another - particularly when we meet as strangers to one another. The 
recognition of such vulnerability may result in wariness, tempered per-
haps by politeness, leading us keep our distance from the stranger. In a 
more corrosive form, however, awareness of our vulnerability may 
evoke hostility - even to the point of taking "war" as a defining feature 
of the condition we expect to pervade some portion of our relations to at 
least some of our fellow humans. In contrast, hospitality that is enacted 
as a gracious receptivity of the otherness of the stranger, is far more than 
a wary politeness that allows us to mark a barrier between "us" and 
"them" that is transgressed at peril. It is the enacted risk of greeting 
another's vulnerability out of our own - and the acceptance of that 
enacted risk by the one welcomed - that allows each of us to stand upon 
a new space of respect that issues from a mutual recognition of vulnera-
bility. 
The mutual recognition suggested here - that we stand both as 
"homeless" and yet as "guests to one another" on the fractured terrain 
of modernity - is one that I believe has an important role to play in the 
construction of an anthropology of the fragility of human freedom and, 
a fortiori, in a account of graced human empowerment to see, love, and 
bring good to be in our broken world. Central to this anthropology is a 
capacity for human freedom to enact in and through hospitality (or, to 
use Steiner's term, in its "courtesy") a "seeing good" informed by the 
37. HOBSON, On Being a Peifect Guest (n. 33), p. 15. 
38. I. KANT, Toward Perpetual Peace, trans. Mary J. GREGOR, in GUYER - WOOD, 
Practical Philosophy (n. 7), pp. 328-31; Zum ewigen Frieden, in Kants Gesammelte 
Schriften (n. 7), 8, pp. 357-360; The Metaphysics of Morals, in Practical Philosophy 
(n. 7), pp. 489-490; Die Metaphysik der Sitten, in Kants Gesammelte Schriften (n. 7), 6, 
pp. 352-353. See Philip J. ROSSI, Cosmopolitanism and the Interests of Reason: A Social 
Framework for Human Action in History, in Proceedings of the x International Kant 
Congress, Berlin, Walter de Gruyter (forthcoming). 
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graciousness of an incarnate God whose sojourn with us has made it 
possible for even such fractured ground to be made into a place of wel-
come. An apt starting place for theological reflection on hospitality as 
locus for the enactment of a seeing good that brings good to be might 
very well be - for lack of a more felicitous phrase - the "underside" of 
God's incarnation into the fractured contingency that constitutes the 
dynamics of our human world. That "underside" is the absence of wel-
come, the unavailability of hospitality, encountered by God's Word 
incarnate - an unavailability marked in human terms in Luke's infancy 
narrative as "no room at the inn" and in cosmic terms in John's pro-
logue as "his own received him not". Yet this absence, unavailability, 
even refusal of welcome is met not by its counterpart, but by its radical 
inversion: The ignored, unwelcomed guest becomes the welcomer, 
human inhospitality is reciprocated in gracious irony by a divine hospi-
tality in which God makes the fractured world a place for divine wel-
coming of the human in all its contingency and brokenness. 
Recognition that the first hospitality is God's as condition for the pos-
sibility for our enactment of mutual welcome as guests to one another on 
the fractured terrain we have inherited from modernity is thus recogni-
tion that we do so within the ambit of grace. This first hospitality has 
welcomed us in all our human fracturedness to the point of making our 
fragile humanity God's very place of dwelling; it is thus in God's wel-
come enacted in the Word creative and incarnate that we are empowered 
to welcome each other. To Neiman's trope of "homeless" we can, I 
believe, appropriately add that our condition of homelessness in a world 
of fractured meaning does not leave us bereft of the gifts and skills of a 
hospitality through which the radiance of the divine hospitality that 
enables us to welcome each other can be glimpsed39• 
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